How Cartels Endure and How They Fail

Studies of Industrial Collusion

Edited by Peter Z. Grossman, Clarence Efroymson Chair in Economics, Butler University, US

Why do some cartels fail and others succeed? This question has intrigued economists for a hundred years, and they have created an extensive body of theory to help explain cartel behaviour. This book looks at the experience of actual cartels and challenges their portrayal as found in the existing literature.

‘The book is indispensable reading for economic historians, policymakers, and economists, including those committed to the free market ideal.’
– Kwan Man Bun, Enterprise & Society

‘The volume . . . includes fine chapters on research joint ventures, collusion in declining industries and government policy toward cartels in Japan. Taken as a whole, the book provides fascinating insights, calls into question some traditional views, and points the way for future research. It is an extremely valuable contribution to the study of cartels.’
– Richard Sicotte, EH.NET

这本书是一个bout one of the most elusive problems in industrial organization – why some collusive agreements flourish while others fail. It brings together, in one place, much of the best recent work in the literature on this topic. I think the book will become a staple of reading lists for graduate industrial organization courses, and it will be invaluable for antitrust lawyers and policymakers.’
– Sam Peltzman, University of Chicago, US