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The Economics of Tax Avoidance and Evasion
Tax compliance issues enjoy an unprecedented degree of public attention today and are of great importance to governments and policymaking. This single volume provides an overview of some of the most significant contributions to the economic analysis of tax avoidance and evasion and also sheds light on broader questions of social organization, behaviour, and compliance with the law. With an original introduction by the editor, this insightful book provides researchers and students with a guide to the fundamental intellectual developments that have shaped the economic understanding of tax avoidance and evasion, along with a framework for placing these contributions in their intellectual context.
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Critical Acclaim
Contributors
Contents
更多信息
Tax compliance issues enjoy an unprecedented degree of public attention today and are of great importance to governments and policymaking. This single volume provides an overview of some of the most significant contributions to the economic analysis of tax avoidance and evasion and also sheds light on broader questions of social organization, behaviour, and compliance with the law. With an original introduction by the editor, this insightful book provides researchers and students with a guide to the fundamental intellectual developments that have shaped the economic understanding of tax avoidance and evasion, along with a framework for placing these contributions in their intellectual context.
Critical Acclaim
‘Tax evasion and avoidance are nowadays headline news and combating them plays a central role in tax design. Dhammika Dharmapala has done an outstanding job in bringing together the key economics literature on these topics, going back nearly 50 years. Major contributions from the seminal theory of the early 1970s to recent large-scale empirical analyses are included, with much in between. The volume provides a great reference for academics, policy makers and anyone else interested in tax evasion and avoidance.’
- 英国牛津大学迈克尔·德弗勒克斯（Michael Devereux）
- 英国牛津大学迈克尔·德弗勒克斯（Michael Devereux）
Contributors
44篇文章，可追溯到1972年至2016年
Contributors include: J. Andreoni, A. Auerbach, R. Chetty, M. Desai, M. Feldstein, J.R. Hines, Jr., L. Kaplow, E. Saez, J. Slemrod, J. Stiglitz
Contributors include: J. Andreoni, A. Auerbach, R. Chetty, M. Desai, M. Feldstein, J.R. Hines, Jr., L. Kaplow, E. Saez, J. Slemrod, J. Stiglitz
Contents
Contents:
简介Dhammika Dharmapala
PART I PIONEERING CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF TAX EVASION
1。Michael G. Allingham and Agnar Sandmo (1972), ‘Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis’, Journal of Public Economics, 1 (3-4), 323–38
2. T.N. Srinivasan (1973), ‘Tax Evasion: A Model’, Journal of Public Economics, 2 (4), 339–46
3. Shlomo Yitzhaki（1974），“逃避所得税的注释：理论分析”，《公共经济学杂志》，3（2），201–2
第二部分的开创性逃税实证研究
4. Charles T. Clotfelter (1983), ‘Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns’, Review of Economics and Statistics, LXV (3), August, 363–73
5. Jonathan S. Feinstein (1991), ‘An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and its Detection’, RAND Journal of Economics, 22 (1), Spring, 14–35
6. James Alm，Gary H. McClelland和William D. Schulze（1992），“为什么人们要缴税？”，《公共经济学杂志》，48（1），6月21日至38日
7. Joel Slemrod, Marsha Blumenthal and Charles Christian (2001), ‘Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota’, Journal of Public Economics, 79 (3), March, 455–83
8. Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian, Joel Slemrod and Matthew G. Smith (2001), ‘Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota’, National Tax Journal, 54 (1), March, 125–38
PART III THEORIES OF TAX AUDITING: PRINCIPAL-AGENT AND GAME-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVES
9. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1985), ‘Income Tax Compliance in a Principal-Agent Framework’, Journal of Public Economics, 26 (1), February, 1–18
10. Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2 (1), Spring, 1–32
11。Parkash Chander and Louis L. Wilde (1998), ‘A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement’, Review of Economic Studies, 65 (1), January, 165–83
PART IV TOPICS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION
12. Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki（1987），“税收征收机构的最佳规模”，斯堪的纳维亚经济学杂志，89（2），183-92，183-92
13. Parkash Chander and Louis Wilde (1992), ‘Corruption in Tax Administration’, Journal of Public Economics, 49 (3), December, 333–49
14. Dhammika Dharmapala, Joel Slemrod and John Douglas Wilson (2011), ‘Tax Policy and the Missing Middle: Optimal Tax Remittance with Firm-Level Administrative Costs’, Journal of Public Economics, 95 (9-10), October, 1036–47
15. Adnan Q. Khan, Asim I. Khwaja and Benjamin A. Olken (2016), ‘Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (1), February, 219–71
PART IV THE IMPLICATIONS OF TAX EVASION FOR THE THEORY OF OPTIMAL TAXATION
16.路易斯·卡普洛（Louis Kaplow）（1990），“具有昂贵的执法和逃避税收”，《公共经济学杂志》，第43（2）期，11月221-36
17. Helmuth Cremer和Firouz Gahvari（1995），“逃税与最佳一般所得税”，《公共经济学杂志》，60（2），5月235-49
第六部分逃税：理论观点
18. Kong-Pin Chen和C.Y.Cyrus Chu（2005），“内部控制与外部操作：企业所得税模型”，兰德经济学杂志，36（1），春季，151-64
19. Keith J. Crocker and Joel Slemrod (2005), ‘Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs’, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (9 -10), September, 1593–610
PART VII INFORMATION REPORTING AND THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES IN TAX COMPLIANCE
20. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven，Martin B. Knudsen，Claus Thustrup Kreiner，SørenPedersen和Emmanuel Saez（2011），‘不愿或无法作弊？来自丹麦的税收审计实验的证据，《计量经济学》，79（3），5月651 - 92年
21. Dina Pomeranz（2015），“没有信息的没有征税：威慑和自我执行，在增值税中”，《美国经济评论》，105（8），8月，2539 - 69年
22. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Claus Thustrup Kreiner and Emmanuel Saez (2016), ‘Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries’, Economica, 83 (330), April, 219–46
第VIII部分跨境逃税
23.菲利普Bacchetta和玛丽亚巴斯埃斯皮诺萨(1995), ‘Information Sharing and Tax Competition among Governments’, Journal of International Economics, 39 (1-2), August, 103–21
24. Gabriel Zucman (2013), ‘The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. Net Debtors or Net Creditors?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128 (3), 1321–64
PART IX GENERAL PERSPECTIVES ON TAX AVOIDANCE
25. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1985), ‘The General Theory of Tax Avoidance’, National Tax Journal, 38 (3), September, 325–37
26. Alan J. Auerbach (1991), ‘Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation’, American Economic Review, 81 (1), March, 167–78
27. David A Weisbach (2002), ‘An Economic Analysis of Anti‐Tax‐Avoidance Doctrines’, American Law and Economics Review, 4 (1), Spring, 88–115
X部分避税
28. Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala (2006), ‘Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-powered Incentives’, Journal of Financial Economics, 79 (1), January, 145–79
29. Mihir A. Desai和Dhammika Dharmapala（2009），“企业避税和公司价值”，《经济学和统计评论》，91（3），8月，537-46
30. Michelle Hanlon和Joel Slemrod（2009），‘税收侵略性信号是什么？股票价格反应到有关税收庇护参与的新闻的证据”，《公共经济学杂志》，93（1-2），2月，126-41
XI基础侵蚀和跨国公司的利润转移
31. James R. Hines, Jr. and Eric M. Rice (1994), ‘Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (1), February, 149–82
32. Harry Huizinga和Luc Laeven（2008），“跨国公司中的国际利润转移：多国观点”，《公共经济学杂志》，92（5-6），1164 - 82年6月，1164 - 82年
33. Dhammika Dharmapala和Nadine Riedel（2013），“收入冲击和税收动机的收入转移：来自欧洲跨国公司的证据”，《公共经济学杂志》，97年1月，95-107
第十三部分避税和死权损失失去税收
34. Martin Feldstein (1999), ‘Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 81 (4), November, 674–80
35.乔尔·斯莱姆罗德（Joel Slemrod，2001），“行为对税收的行为反应的一般模型”，国际税和公共财政，8（2），3月，119-28
36. Raj Chetty (2009), ‘Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance’, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1 (2), August, 31–52
第十三部分的逃税和避免分析：档次和纠结的证据
37. Joel Slemrod (1985), ‘An Empirical Test for Tax Evasion’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 67 (2), May, 232–38
38. Emmanuel Saez（2010年），“纳税人在Kink Points？
39. Michael Carlos Best, Anne Brockmeyer, Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Johannes Spinnewijn and Mazhar Waseem (2015), ‘Production versus Revenue Efficiency with Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan’, Journal of Political Economy, 123 (6), October, 1311–55
XIV部分税收气备和税收假期的后果对跨国公司的后果
40. James Andreoni (1991), ‘The Desirability of a Permanent Tax Amnesty’, Journal of Public Economics, 45 (2), 143–59
41. Dhammika Dharmapala, C. Fritz Foley and Kristin J. Forbes (2011), ‘Watch What I do, Not What I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act’, Journal of Finance, 66 (3), June, 753–87
第十五部分税收天堂的特征及其在避税和逃避中的作用
42. Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley and James R. Hines, Jr. (2006), ‘The Demand for Tax Haven Operations’, Journal of Public Economics, 90 (3), March, 513–31
43. Dhammika Dharmapala和James R. Hines，Jr。（2009），“哪些国家成为避税天堂？”，《公共经济学杂志》，93（9-10），1058 - 68年10月，1058 - 68年
44.尼尔斯·Johannesen和加布里埃尔Zucman(2014),“The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown’, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6 (1), 65–91
指数
简介Dhammika Dharmapala
PART I PIONEERING CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF TAX EVASION
1。Michael G. Allingham and Agnar Sandmo (1972), ‘Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis’, Journal of Public Economics, 1 (3-4), 323–38
2. T.N. Srinivasan (1973), ‘Tax Evasion: A Model’, Journal of Public Economics, 2 (4), 339–46
3. Shlomo Yitzhaki（1974），“逃避所得税的注释：理论分析”，《公共经济学杂志》，3（2），201–2
第二部分的开创性逃税实证研究
4. Charles T. Clotfelter (1983), ‘Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns’, Review of Economics and Statistics, LXV (3), August, 363–73
5. Jonathan S. Feinstein (1991), ‘An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and its Detection’, RAND Journal of Economics, 22 (1), Spring, 14–35
6. James Alm，Gary H. McClelland和William D. Schulze（1992），“为什么人们要缴税？”，《公共经济学杂志》，48（1），6月21日至38日
7. Joel Slemrod, Marsha Blumenthal and Charles Christian (2001), ‘Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota’, Journal of Public Economics, 79 (3), March, 455–83
8. Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian, Joel Slemrod and Matthew G. Smith (2001), ‘Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota’, National Tax Journal, 54 (1), March, 125–38
PART III THEORIES OF TAX AUDITING: PRINCIPAL-AGENT AND GAME-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVES
9. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1985), ‘Income Tax Compliance in a Principal-Agent Framework’, Journal of Public Economics, 26 (1), February, 1–18
10. Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2 (1), Spring, 1–32
11。Parkash Chander and Louis L. Wilde (1998), ‘A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement’, Review of Economic Studies, 65 (1), January, 165–83
PART IV TOPICS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION
12. Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki（1987），“税收征收机构的最佳规模”，斯堪的纳维亚经济学杂志，89（2），183-92，183-92
13. Parkash Chander and Louis Wilde (1992), ‘Corruption in Tax Administration’, Journal of Public Economics, 49 (3), December, 333–49
14. Dhammika Dharmapala, Joel Slemrod and John Douglas Wilson (2011), ‘Tax Policy and the Missing Middle: Optimal Tax Remittance with Firm-Level Administrative Costs’, Journal of Public Economics, 95 (9-10), October, 1036–47
15. Adnan Q. Khan, Asim I. Khwaja and Benjamin A. Olken (2016), ‘Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (1), February, 219–71
PART IV THE IMPLICATIONS OF TAX EVASION FOR THE THEORY OF OPTIMAL TAXATION
16.路易斯·卡普洛（Louis Kaplow）（1990），“具有昂贵的执法和逃避税收”，《公共经济学杂志》，第43（2）期，11月221-36
17. Helmuth Cremer和Firouz Gahvari（1995），“逃税与最佳一般所得税”，《公共经济学杂志》，60（2），5月235-49
第六部分逃税：理论观点
18. Kong-Pin Chen和C.Y.Cyrus Chu（2005），“内部控制与外部操作：企业所得税模型”，兰德经济学杂志，36（1），春季，151-64
19. Keith J. Crocker and Joel Slemrod (2005), ‘Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs’, Journal of Public Economics, 89 (9 -10), September, 1593–610
PART VII INFORMATION REPORTING AND THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARIES IN TAX COMPLIANCE
20. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven，Martin B. Knudsen，Claus Thustrup Kreiner，SørenPedersen和Emmanuel Saez（2011），‘不愿或无法作弊？来自丹麦的税收审计实验的证据，《计量经济学》，79（3），5月651 - 92年
21. Dina Pomeranz（2015），“没有信息的没有征税：威慑和自我执行，在增值税中”，《美国经济评论》，105（8），8月，2539 - 69年
22. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Claus Thustrup Kreiner and Emmanuel Saez (2016), ‘Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries’, Economica, 83 (330), April, 219–46
第VIII部分跨境逃税
23.菲利普Bacchetta和玛丽亚巴斯埃斯皮诺萨(1995), ‘Information Sharing and Tax Competition among Governments’, Journal of International Economics, 39 (1-2), August, 103–21
24. Gabriel Zucman (2013), ‘The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. Net Debtors or Net Creditors?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128 (3), 1321–64
PART IX GENERAL PERSPECTIVES ON TAX AVOIDANCE
25. Joseph E. Stiglitz (1985), ‘The General Theory of Tax Avoidance’, National Tax Journal, 38 (3), September, 325–37
26. Alan J. Auerbach (1991), ‘Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation’, American Economic Review, 81 (1), March, 167–78
27. David A Weisbach (2002), ‘An Economic Analysis of Anti‐Tax‐Avoidance Doctrines’, American Law and Economics Review, 4 (1), Spring, 88–115
X部分避税
28. Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala (2006), ‘Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-powered Incentives’, Journal of Financial Economics, 79 (1), January, 145–79
29. Mihir A. Desai和Dhammika Dharmapala（2009），“企业避税和公司价值”，《经济学和统计评论》，91（3），8月，537-46
30. Michelle Hanlon和Joel Slemrod（2009），‘税收侵略性信号是什么？股票价格反应到有关税收庇护参与的新闻的证据”，《公共经济学杂志》，93（1-2），2月，126-41
XI基础侵蚀和跨国公司的利润转移
31. James R. Hines, Jr. and Eric M. Rice (1994), ‘Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (1), February, 149–82
32. Harry Huizinga和Luc Laeven（2008），“跨国公司中的国际利润转移：多国观点”，《公共经济学杂志》，92（5-6），1164 - 82年6月，1164 - 82年
33. Dhammika Dharmapala和Nadine Riedel（2013），“收入冲击和税收动机的收入转移：来自欧洲跨国公司的证据”，《公共经济学杂志》，97年1月，95-107
第十三部分避税和死权损失失去税收
34. Martin Feldstein (1999), ‘Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 81 (4), November, 674–80
35.乔尔·斯莱姆罗德（Joel Slemrod，2001），“行为对税收的行为反应的一般模型”，国际税和公共财政，8（2），3月，119-28
36. Raj Chetty (2009), ‘Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance’, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1 (2), August, 31–52
第十三部分的逃税和避免分析：档次和纠结的证据
37. Joel Slemrod (1985), ‘An Empirical Test for Tax Evasion’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 67 (2), May, 232–38
38. Emmanuel Saez（2010年），“纳税人在Kink Points？
39. Michael Carlos Best, Anne Brockmeyer, Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Johannes Spinnewijn and Mazhar Waseem (2015), ‘Production versus Revenue Efficiency with Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan’, Journal of Political Economy, 123 (6), October, 1311–55
XIV部分税收气备和税收假期的后果对跨国公司的后果
40. James Andreoni (1991), ‘The Desirability of a Permanent Tax Amnesty’, Journal of Public Economics, 45 (2), 143–59
41. Dhammika Dharmapala, C. Fritz Foley and Kristin J. Forbes (2011), ‘Watch What I do, Not What I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act’, Journal of Finance, 66 (3), June, 753–87
第十五部分税收天堂的特征及其在避税和逃避中的作用
42. Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley and James R. Hines, Jr. (2006), ‘The Demand for Tax Haven Operations’, Journal of Public Economics, 90 (3), March, 513–31
43. Dhammika Dharmapala和James R. Hines，Jr。（2009），“哪些国家成为避税天堂？”，《公共经济学杂志》，93（9-10），1058 - 68年10月，1058 - 68年
44.尼尔斯·Johannesen和加布里埃尔Zucman(2014),“The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown’, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6 (1), 65–91
指数
