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The WTO, Safeguards, and Temporary Protection from Imports
世界贸易组织（WTO）下的临时保护免受公开交易的进口，通常是指国家政府使用“保障”关税，配额或关税率配额。保障规定允许世贸组织成员的国民政府调查家庭工业工业工业是否因交易相当但进口商品而受伤；然后施加临时的单方面进口限制，否则将违反市场访问承诺。本书介绍了经济学，法律和政策文献中的一些关键理论和经验研究文章，研究了这种临时进口保护计划的结构和使用。
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备受好评
Contributors
Contents
More Information
世界贸易组织（WTO）下的临时保护免受公开交易的进口，通常是指国家政府使用“保障”关税，配额或关税率配额。保障规定允许世贸组织成员的国民政府调查家庭工业工业工业是否因交易相当但进口商品而受伤；然后施加临时的单方面进口限制，否则将违反市场访问承诺。本书介绍了经济学，法律和政策文献中的一些关键理论和经验研究文章，研究了这种临时进口保护计划的结构和使用。
This insightful collection will be an important reference source for economists and researchers interested in international trade policy and the rules of the underlying WTO system.
This insightful collection will be an important reference source for economists and researchers interested in international trade policy and the rules of the underlying WTO system.
备受好评
‘这是该领域的杰出作家在法律，经济和政治理由上有争议地使用WTO保障机制的法律，经济和政治理由。该主题备受尊重的分析师乍得·鲍恩（Chad Bown）的介绍提供了有关本辩论的上下文和关键领域的说明。除了成为必不可少的参考工具外，该卷还为未来研究提供了肥沃的来源，并将对学者，学生和政策制定者非常有用，对国际贸易和保护的政治经济学感兴趣。’
– Robert Read, Lancaster University Management School, UK
– Robert Read, Lancaster University Management School, UK
Contributors
22篇文章，可追溯到1976年至2005年
Contributors include: K. Bagwell, R.E. Baldwin, J. Bhagwati, D.A. Irwin, J.H. Jackson, R. McCulloch, T.J. Prusa, R.W. Staiger, A.O. Sykes, G. Tabellini
Contributors include: K. Bagwell, R.E. Baldwin, J. Bhagwati, D.A. Irwin, J.H. Jackson, R. McCulloch, T.J. Prusa, R.W. Staiger, A.O. Sykes, G. Tabellini
Contents
内容：
Acknowledgements
Introduction Chad P. Bown
PART I HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONS
1. John H. Jackson (1997), ‘Safeguards and Adjustment Policies’
2. Alan V. Deardorff (1987), ‘Safeguards Policy and the Conservative Social Welfare Function’
3. J. Michael Finger（2002），“保障措施：允许进口限制的Gatt/WTO规定有意义”
PART II ECONOMIC THEORY: DIFFICULTIES IN MAKING THE CASE FOR IMPORT-RESTRICTING SAFEGUARD POLICIES
4. Jagdish N. Bhagwati（1976），“市场中断，出口市场中断，薪酬和加特的改革”
5. Michael Mussa (1978), ‘Dynamic Adjustment in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model’
6. Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1987), ‘Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection’
第三部分经济理论：保障规定和设计
7. Kyle Bagwell和Robert W. Staiger（1990），“托管贸易理论”
8. Ronald D. Fischer and Thomas J. Prusa (2003), ‘WTO Exceptions as Insurance’
9. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2005), ‘Enforcement, Private Political Pressure, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade / World Trade Organization Escape Clause’
第四部分经济理论：保障措施和“调整”
10. Kaz Miyagiwa和Yuka Ohno（1995），“在保护下缩小技术差距”
11. Arye L. Hillman (1982), ‘Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives’
12. S. Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997), ‘The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited’
13. Carl Davidson和Steven J. Matusz（2004），“逃生条款保护的重叠生成模型”
PART V EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SAFEGUARDS
14. Steven Berry, James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes (1999), ‘Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy’
15. James C. Hartigan, Philip R. Perry and Sreenivas Kamma (1986), ‘The Value of Administered Protection: A Capital Market Approach’
16. Robert E. Baldwin and Jeffrey W. Steagall (1994), ‘An Analysis of ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases’
17.温迪·汉森（Wendy L. Hansen）和托马斯·J·普鲁萨（Thomas J.
18. Chad P. Bown（2004年），“贸易争端和根据Gatt下的保护：经验评估”
19. Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1999), ‘Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?’
20. Chad P. Bown和Rachel McCulloch（2004），“ WTO保障协议：歧视性影响的经验分析”
第六部分的政策使用，法律流程和争议解决
21. Douglas A. Irwin (2003), ‘Causing Problems? The WTO Review of Causation and Injury Attribution in US Section 201 Cases’
22. Alan O. Sykes（2003），“保障措施：对WTO法学的批评”
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Chad P. Bown
PART I HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONS
1. John H. Jackson (1997), ‘Safeguards and Adjustment Policies’
2. Alan V. Deardorff (1987), ‘Safeguards Policy and the Conservative Social Welfare Function’
3. J. Michael Finger（2002），“保障措施：允许进口限制的Gatt/WTO规定有意义”
PART II ECONOMIC THEORY: DIFFICULTIES IN MAKING THE CASE FOR IMPORT-RESTRICTING SAFEGUARD POLICIES
4. Jagdish N. Bhagwati（1976），“市场中断，出口市场中断，薪酬和加特的改革”
5. Michael Mussa (1978), ‘Dynamic Adjustment in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model’
6. Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1987), ‘Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection’
第三部分经济理论：保障规定和设计
7. Kyle Bagwell和Robert W. Staiger（1990），“托管贸易理论”
8. Ronald D. Fischer and Thomas J. Prusa (2003), ‘WTO Exceptions as Insurance’
9. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2005), ‘Enforcement, Private Political Pressure, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade / World Trade Organization Escape Clause’
第四部分经济理论：保障措施和“调整”
10. Kaz Miyagiwa和Yuka Ohno（1995），“在保护下缩小技术差距”
11. Arye L. Hillman (1982), ‘Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives’
12. S. Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997), ‘The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited’
13. Carl Davidson和Steven J. Matusz（2004），“逃生条款保护的重叠生成模型”
PART V EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SAFEGUARDS
14. Steven Berry, James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes (1999), ‘Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy’
15. James C. Hartigan, Philip R. Perry and Sreenivas Kamma (1986), ‘The Value of Administered Protection: A Capital Market Approach’
16. Robert E. Baldwin and Jeffrey W. Steagall (1994), ‘An Analysis of ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases’
17.温迪·汉森（Wendy L. Hansen）和托马斯·J·普鲁萨（Thomas J.
18. Chad P. Bown（2004年），“贸易争端和根据Gatt下的保护：经验评估”
19. Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1999), ‘Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?’
20. Chad P. Bown和Rachel McCulloch（2004），“ WTO保障协议：歧视性影响的经验分析”
第六部分的政策使用，法律流程和争议解决
21. Douglas A. Irwin (2003), ‘Causing Problems? The WTO Review of Causation and Injury Attribution in US Section 201 Cases’
22. Alan O. Sykes（2003），“保障措施：对WTO法学的批评”
Name Index
