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公司财务理论
In The Theory of Corporate Finance, Michael J. Brennan has brought together a set of major papers which defines the current status of the theory of corporate finance. This authoritative collection emphasizes recent research, while also including representative classics in the field.
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备受好评
Contributors
内容
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In The Theory of Corporate Finance, Michael J. Brennan has brought together a set of major papers which defines the current status of the theory of corporate finance. This authoritative collection emphasizes recent research, while also including representative classics in the field.
The main paradigms in corporate finance are addressed in these volumes, with particular attention to the problems raised by information asymmetries and the responses to them. Major sections deal with issues including shareholder objectives, agency and monitoring, adverse selection and signalling, reputation, and contracting and incentives.
公司财务理论also covers the application of the paradigms of corporate finance to particular aspects of corporate financial decisions and relationships. These include initial public offerings of common stock, the role of debt contracts, the relation between financial structure and the real asset and product markets, capital investment decisions, hedging and disclosure policy, insider trading, the effect of taxes on financial policy, takeover contests and the assignment of voting and control rights, and corporate bankruptcy.
迈克尔·布伦南（Michael J. Brennan）的两卷集将重要的文章和论文汇总在一起，这些文章和论文代表了公司财务理论的当前状态，确保该系列将成为金融和金融经济学的学者，学生和从业者的宝贵资源。
The main paradigms in corporate finance are addressed in these volumes, with particular attention to the problems raised by information asymmetries and the responses to them. Major sections deal with issues including shareholder objectives, agency and monitoring, adverse selection and signalling, reputation, and contracting and incentives.
公司财务理论also covers the application of the paradigms of corporate finance to particular aspects of corporate financial decisions and relationships. These include initial public offerings of common stock, the role of debt contracts, the relation between financial structure and the real asset and product markets, capital investment decisions, hedging and disclosure policy, insider trading, the effect of taxes on financial policy, takeover contests and the assignment of voting and control rights, and corporate bankruptcy.
迈克尔·布伦南（Michael J. Brennan）的两卷集将重要的文章和论文汇总在一起，这些文章和论文代表了公司财务理论的当前状态，确保该系列将成为金融和金融经济学的学者，学生和从业者的宝贵资源。
备受好评
“工作是一个特殊的文章, one that I have already utilized in teaching a Ph.D. seminar in corporate finance. I would recommend the volumes as worthwhile investment to anyone desiring to explore the frontiers of corporate finance research.’
- 托马斯·H·诺（Thomas H. Noe），《金融杂志》
- 托马斯·H·诺（Thomas H. Noe），《金融杂志》
Contributors
46篇文章，可追溯到1976年至1994年
贡献者包括：D.W。Diamond，M.J。Fishman，S.J。O.D. GrossmanHart，D。Hirshleifer，M.C。Jensen，H。Leyland，W.H。梅克林（R.M.）Mooradian，S。Titman
贡献者包括：D.W。Diamond，M.J。Fishman，S.J。O.D. GrossmanHart，D。Hirshleifer，M.C。Jensen，H。Leyland，W.H。梅克林（R.M.）Mooradian，S。Titman
内容
Volume I
Acknowledgements
Foreword by Richard Roll
Introduction by the editor
Part I Shareholder Objectives
1. H. DeAngelo (1981), ‘Competition and Unanimity’
2. L. Makowski (1983), ‘Competition and Unanimity Revisited’
3. H. Leland (1977), ‘Information, Managerial Choice and Stockholder Unanimity’
第二部分代理机构和监视
4. M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’
5. S.C. Myers (1977), ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing’
6. R.M. Stulz (1990), ‘Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies’
7. A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (1986), ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’
8. B. Holmström and J. Tirole (1993), ‘Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring’
Part III Adverse Selection and Signalling
9. S.C. Myers和N.S.Majlup（1984），“公司融资和投资决策，当公司拥有投资者没有的信息时”
10. H.E.Leland and D.H. Pyle（1977），“信息不对称，财务结构和金融中介”
11. M.H. Miller and K. Rock (1985), ‘Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information’
12. R. Ambarish，K。John和J. Williams（1987），“有效的股息和投资信号”
13. M.J. Brennan and A. Kraus (1987), ‘Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information’
第四部分的声誉
14. D.W.Diamond（1989），“债务市场的声誉获取”
15. A.W.A.Boot，S.I。Greenbaum和A.V.Thakor（1993），“金融合同的声誉和酌处权”
第五部分的合同和激励措施
16. P. Aghion和P. Bolton（1992），“财务合同的不完整合同方法”
17. M.P. Narayanan (1985), ‘Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results’
18. D. Hirshleifer and Y. Suh (1992), ‘Risk, Managerial Effort and Project Choice’
第六部分首次公开产品
19. K. Rock (1986), ‘Why New Issues are Underpriced’
20. I. Welch（1992），“顺序销售，学习和级联”
21. C. Spatt and S. Srivastava (1991), ‘Preplay Communication, Participation Restrictions, and Efficiency in Initial Public Offerings’
Part VII Debt Markets
22. R.G.Rajan（1992），“内部人士和局外人：知情与武器长度债务之间的选择”
23. D.W.Dimand（1993），“债务合同的资历和成熟度”
Name Index
第二卷
Acknowledgements
An Introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
第一部分的财务结构以及真正的资产和产品市场
1. S. Titman（1984），“资本结构对公司清算决定的影响”
2. V. Maksimovic and J. Zechner (1991), ‘Debt, Agency Costs, and Industry Equilibrium’
3. A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (1992), ‘Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach’
4. P. Volton和D.S. Scharfstein（1990），“基于财务合同的代理问题的捕食理论”
Part II Capital Investment and Valuation
5. M.J. Brennan（1990），“潜在资产”
6. M.J. Brennan和D.S. Schwartz（1985），“评估自然资源投资”
7. J.E. Ingersoll, Jr. and S.A. Ross (1992), ‘Waiting to Invest: Investment and Uncertainty’
8. H.E. Leland (1994), ‘Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure’
第三部分对冲，披露政策和内部交易
9.下午Demarzo和D. Duffie（1991），“拥有专有信息的公司财务对冲”
10. K.A.Froot，D.S。Scharfstein和J.C. Stein（1993），“风险管理：协调公司投资和融资政策”
11. M.J. Fishman和K.M.Hagerty（1989），“公司的披露决定和价格效率的竞争”
12. H.E. Leland (1992), ‘Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?’
Part IV Taxes and Financial Policy
13. M.H.米勒（1977），“债务和税收”
14. F. Modigliani (1982), ‘Debt, Dividend Policy, Taxes, Inflation and Market Valuation’
15. S.A. Ross（1985），“债务和税收和不确定性”
Part V Voting and Control
16. S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart (1988), ‘One Share–One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control’
17. M. Harris和A. Raviv（1989），“证券设计”
第六部分接管比赛
18. S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart (1980), ‘Takeover Bids the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation’
19. M.J. Fishman（1989），“先发制人的投标和交换媒介在收购中的作用”
20. D. Hirshleifer and S. Titman (1990), ‘Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids’
第七部分公司破产
21. R.M.Giammarino（1989），“财务困境的解决”
22. R. Gertner和D. Scharfstein（1991），“锻炼理论和重组法的影响”
23. R.M. Mooradian (1994), ‘The Effect of Bankruptcy Protection on Investment: Chapter 11 as a Screening Device’
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Foreword by Richard Roll
Introduction by the editor
Part I Shareholder Objectives
1. H. DeAngelo (1981), ‘Competition and Unanimity’
2. L. Makowski (1983), ‘Competition and Unanimity Revisited’
3. H. Leland (1977), ‘Information, Managerial Choice and Stockholder Unanimity’
第二部分代理机构和监视
4. M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’
5. S.C. Myers (1977), ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing’
6. R.M. Stulz (1990), ‘Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies’
7. A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (1986), ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’
8. B. Holmström and J. Tirole (1993), ‘Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring’
Part III Adverse Selection and Signalling
9. S.C. Myers和N.S.Majlup（1984），“公司融资和投资决策，当公司拥有投资者没有的信息时”
10. H.E.Leland and D.H. Pyle（1977），“信息不对称，财务结构和金融中介”
11. M.H. Miller and K. Rock (1985), ‘Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information’
12. R. Ambarish，K。John和J. Williams（1987），“有效的股息和投资信号”
13. M.J. Brennan and A. Kraus (1987), ‘Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information’
第四部分的声誉
14. D.W.Diamond（1989），“债务市场的声誉获取”
15. A.W.A.Boot，S.I。Greenbaum和A.V.Thakor（1993），“金融合同的声誉和酌处权”
第五部分的合同和激励措施
16. P. Aghion和P. Bolton（1992），“财务合同的不完整合同方法”
17. M.P. Narayanan (1985), ‘Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results’
18. D. Hirshleifer and Y. Suh (1992), ‘Risk, Managerial Effort and Project Choice’
第六部分首次公开产品
19. K. Rock (1986), ‘Why New Issues are Underpriced’
20. I. Welch（1992），“顺序销售，学习和级联”
21. C. Spatt and S. Srivastava (1991), ‘Preplay Communication, Participation Restrictions, and Efficiency in Initial Public Offerings’
Part VII Debt Markets
22. R.G.Rajan（1992），“内部人士和局外人：知情与武器长度债务之间的选择”
23. D.W.Dimand（1993），“债务合同的资历和成熟度”
Name Index
第二卷
Acknowledgements
An Introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I
第一部分的财务结构以及真正的资产和产品市场
1. S. Titman（1984），“资本结构对公司清算决定的影响”
2. V. Maksimovic and J. Zechner (1991), ‘Debt, Agency Costs, and Industry Equilibrium’
3. A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (1992), ‘Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach’
4. P. Volton和D.S. Scharfstein（1990），“基于财务合同的代理问题的捕食理论”
Part II Capital Investment and Valuation
5. M.J. Brennan（1990），“潜在资产”
6. M.J. Brennan和D.S. Schwartz（1985），“评估自然资源投资”
7. J.E. Ingersoll, Jr. and S.A. Ross (1992), ‘Waiting to Invest: Investment and Uncertainty’
8. H.E. Leland (1994), ‘Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure’
第三部分对冲，披露政策和内部交易
9.下午Demarzo和D. Duffie（1991），“拥有专有信息的公司财务对冲”
10. K.A.Froot，D.S。Scharfstein和J.C. Stein（1993），“风险管理：协调公司投资和融资政策”
11. M.J. Fishman和K.M.Hagerty（1989），“公司的披露决定和价格效率的竞争”
12. H.E. Leland (1992), ‘Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?’
Part IV Taxes and Financial Policy
13. M.H.米勒（1977），“债务和税收”
14. F. Modigliani (1982), ‘Debt, Dividend Policy, Taxes, Inflation and Market Valuation’
15. S.A. Ross（1985），“债务和税收和不确定性”
Part V Voting and Control
16. S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart (1988), ‘One Share–One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control’
17. M. Harris和A. Raviv（1989），“证券设计”
第六部分接管比赛
18. S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart (1980), ‘Takeover Bids the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation’
19. M.J. Fishman（1989），“先发制人的投标和交换媒介在收购中的作用”
20. D. Hirshleifer and S. Titman (1990), ‘Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids’
第七部分公司破产
21. R.M.Giammarino（1989），“财务困境的解决”
22. R. Gertner和D. Scharfstein（1991），“锻炼理论和重组法的影响”
23. R.M. Mooradian (1994), ‘The Effect of Bankruptcy Protection on Investment: Chapter 11 as a Screening Device’
Name Index
