How Cartels Endure and How They Fail

Why do some cartels fail and others succeed? This question has intrigued economists for a hundred years, and they have created an extensive body of theory to help explain cartel behaviour. This book looks at the experience of actual cartels and challenges their portrayal as found in the existing literature.

The eleven chapters by leading researchers of industrial organization study real examples of industrial collusion. The authors investigate the formation, behaviour, activity and purpose of cartels, and illustrate the intricacies of collusive relationships. In the process they question the existing economic theory surrounding the operation of cartels, which in practice do not always adhere to the textbook models or to complex game theoretic rules. Although much economic research suggests that cartels are doomed to failure, the authors find that there are many examples of industries where cartels have succeeded in controlling prices and output over a prolonged period of time.

这本书是一项开创性的尝试，试图在世界范围内经验研究一系列卡特尔，提供了历史和当代的勾结例子来丰富论点。在工业组织和竞争政策领域工作的学术界，政策制定者，律师和经济学家将发现这是一个高度原始且发人深省的卷。